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1 Introduction 
United Nations’ Peace Operations (POs) have achieved many successes over the years. By, 
for example, helping conflicts come to an end, reconciling parties to conflicts, and helping 
with political elections in countries all over the world, the United Nations (UN) has “built up 
an impressive record of peacekeeping achievements over more than 60 years”.1 The UN has 
been most successful in POs in the areas of elections, communications after peace agreements 
and diplomacy.2 Great achievements even led UN peacekeepers to win the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 1988. The press release stated that peacekeepers  
 
“through their efforts have made important contributions towards the realization of 
one of the fundamental tenets of the United Nations. Thus, the world organization 
has come to play a more central part in world affairs and has been invested increas-
ing trust.”3 
 
There have been 69 POs since the first one in 1948. The UN Truce Supervision Or-
ganization (UNTSO) in the Middle East and the UN Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) 
have been stationed in India and Pakistan, since 1948 and 1949, respectively, and are still 
currently operating.4 Today, there are 16 ongoing POs5 and there are 8 high intensity and 20 
medium intensity armed conflicts ongoing in the world.6 This shows the importance of peace-
keepers and the UN as a promoter of international peace and security, and also that there are 
limitations on what to expect of POs seeing as there are more conflicts than there are opera-
tions. 
 
1.1 Topic and research questions 
International organizations (IOs) are increasingly involved in different activities from eco-
nomic and environmental matters to international peace and security. While organizations 
have traditionally been seen as supporters of international law and human rights, due to the 
increased involvement in the various activities, IOs are becoming more likely to violate and 
weaken international law and human rights.7 
                                                
1  Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/success.shtml [Cited: 18 March 2015] 
2  Jacobson (2012), p.1 
3  The Norwegian Nobel Committee, Press Release, 1988 
4  Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml  
5  UNDPKO Fact Sheet at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml  
6  The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database at: http://acd.iiss.org/ [Cited: 20 
March 2015] 
7  Reinisch (2001), p.131 
2 
 
 Although the UN has had its successful operations, it has also had its unsuccessful 
ones, especially in the 1990s like in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia where civil-
ians were massacred.8 The Brahimi Report, which analyzed the shortcomings of POs, admit-
ted that “[n]o failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations 
peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.”9 In fact, 
the PO in Somalia was considered such a failure that the UN Commission of Inquiry conclud-
ed that “the UN should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the 
internal conflicts of States”10 
 Questions have also arisen regarding the UN POs’ obligations to comply with interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). During POs there 
have been incidents where peacekeepers have violated human rights and committed criminal 
offenses like sexual exploitation,11 using excessive force resulting in the death of civilians,12 
and destruction of civilian property.13  
 Steps have been taken to try to address some of these difficulties. In 2000, the Brahimi 
Report made recommendations for a more effective system and more efficient POs. It noted, 
inter alia, the need for clear, credible and achievable mandates, effective mission leadership 
and properly equipped peacekeeping operations.14 It further noted that “traditional peacekeep-
ing … treats the symptoms rather than sources of conflict”.15 In 2005, the President of the 
General Assembly, Prince Zeid, addressed the issue of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers 
and made a report with strategies to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse.16 Fur-
thermore, the Capstone Doctrine17 outlined important principles and guidelines for peace-
keepers, such as the normative framework, the bedrock principles of peacekeeping, planning 
and establishing a peacekeeping operation and effective implementation of the mandate. Also, 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) created a reform strategy, “Peace Op-
erations 2010”18, to strengthen the management and conduct of POs. These reports and strate-
                                                
8  Jacobson (2012), pp.3-4 
9  A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Brahimi Report), p.ix 
10  S/1999/653, cited in S/1999/1257, p.41 
11  A/59/710, p.7, para 3 
12  Statement of the Spokesman for the UN Secretary-General at:  
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8512 [Cited: 6 April 2015] 
13  Letter from Secretary-General 20 February 1965, United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1965), Part One Chap-
ter II, p.39; Reinisch (2001), p.132 and footnote 5, p.144 
14  A/55/305-S/2000/809 
15  ibid., p.3 
16  A/59/710  
17  United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, UNDPKO, 2008 (Capstone Doctrine) 
18  A/60/696, paras.6-21 
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gies were created to ensure the efficiency and the legitimacy of POs, as well as giving the 
personnel in the field clear guidelines to follow. 
 The increased focus on violations of IHRL and IHL has led to increased focus on who 
is responsible for such wrongdoing, and to which entity the conduct is attributable to. This led 
the International Law Commission (ILC) to develop its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations (DARIO)19 drawing on the inspiration from the Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).20 When a State contrib-
utes armed forces to an organization, DARIO provides guidance about attribution of conduct 
and responsibility.  
 Furthermore, when the conduct and the breach of international obligations are attribut-
ed to the UN, the UN needs to accept responsibility in order to make reparations.21 This, as 
will be seen in relation to the cholera outbreak in Haiti, is not always the case.22 Additionally, 
the UN has jurisdictional immunity before national and international courts, which in turn 
leads to the lack of effective remedy for the victims. Violations of international law by IOs 
increase the need for accountability and a closer examination on the immunities granted to the 
UN before judicial entities, as well as how the conduct is attributed to the UN.  
 How the issues of attribution of conduct and responsibility are dealt with in theory is 
not always the same as in case-law. The judgments by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in the Behrami and Saramati cases23, as well as the Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica 
case24, and the criticism which the cases have attracted from scholars, show how the norma-
tive framework is not always followed by judicial entities. 
The main question this thesis addresses is: What difficulties are there in holding the 
UN accountable for violations of international law in POs and how can they be overcome? 
This thesis will address three main difficulties: the UN’s immunity, the UN’s ability to adopt 
resolutions and policies, and how the threshold for attribution of conduct and the command 
and control system affect the possibility of holding the UN accountable.  
The focus will be on the legal consequences for the UN for violations of international 
law in the context of UN authorized POs. How and to which entity the conduct should be at-
tributed to, how this is shown in practice, and the threshold for the attribution of conduct will 
be evaluated. There remains uncertainty as regards to the content and application of the ‘ef-
fective control’ test, and whether dual or multiple attribution of conduct is possible, and the 
thesis will explore options to address these difficulties. 
                                                
19    Adopted by the ILC at its sixty-third session in 2011, A/66/10 
20   Adopted by the ILC at its fifty-third session in 2001, A/56/10 
21  DARIO articles 31, 34-37; Kondoch (2010), p.531 
22  Chapter 4.4 
23  Chapter 5.3.1 
24  Application no.65542/12, Stichting Mothers of Srebreninca and others against the Netherlands, June 2013 
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1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The first chapter of the thesis will explain the methodology used, some terms of importance in 
this thesis, and the development of DARIO. The second chapter will address the development 
of POs, their legal basis, the different types of POs and their command and control structure. 
In the third chapter I will turn to the material criteria for the UN to be held internationally 
responsible for wrongful acts. The focus of the thesis will be on how to ensure remedies for 
violations of international law and not the issue of what law is binding on the UN. Although I 
will briefly address the second issue, the discussion of international responsibility presuppos-
es the presence of an internationally wrongful act.  
 The fourth chapter will take a closer look at some cases to see how the current norma-
tive framework and operative framework are deficient which creates a lack of accountability 
for the UN. Furthermore, the test for attribution of conduct will be analyzed: the content and 
application of effective control as well as the difficulties with the test in practice. 
 Chapter 5 will look at how these difficulties could be mended: how the conditionality 
policy could perhaps be interpreted and used to ensure compliance without making the peace-
keepers ineffective in regards to their mandate, whether the immunity of the UN should be 
absolute, and whether there are other more suitable tests for the attribution of conduct rather 
than ‘effective control’. Finally, chapter 6 will contain some concluding remarks. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis will describe the legal rules for the UN to become responsible for its peacekeepers, 
and then I will look at the deficiencies with the normative framework and how the law possi-
bly should be. The discussion of what the law is will be separated from what it should be. For 
scholars belonging to legal positivism, international law consists of rules the states have given 
their consent to.25 It has been stated that “[w]hat passes for method … has to do with what 
counts as persuasive arguments in international law.”26 Furthermore, “whether a given norm 
is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its 
sources, not its merits”.27 The law will be described by relying on formal criteria and sources. 
Therefore, the sources recognized in international law are of importance. 
 The sources for assessing the questions posed in this thesis will follow the sources 
listed in article 38 of the ICJ Statute which is considered to be the “most authoritative and 
complete statement as to the sources of international law”.28 Article 38 provides that interna-
                                                
25  Ratner (2004), p.5 
26  Koskenniemi (2007) 
27  Gardner (2001), p.199 
28  Shaw (2008), p.70 
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tional conventions, international customary law and general principles of international law are 
the primary sources of law, while judicial decisions and theory are secondary sources. 
 International laws and texts will be read in the light of the principles found in the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)29, especially articles 31 and 32 which lay 
down rules for interpreting international texts. 
 When establishing a PO, several agreements are entered between the UN and troop 
contributing countries (TCC) and the host state. The question arises as to whether such 
agreements are treaties as defined in the VCLT30 and should therefore be interpreted the same 
way as other international treaties. Treaties are different from other agreements seeing as trea-
ties are “governed by international law”31 whereas other types of agreements are not legally 
binding, or governed by another legal system. Therefore, agreements between the UN and 
member states will be viewed as treaties and will be interpreted in accordance with the princi-
ples found in the VCLT.  
 Other UN documents such as reports and statements are not legally binding on mem-
ber states but are rather political obligations. However, these obligations give weight to the 
sources. Additionally, these documents show how the UN is complying with its obligations, 
evaluations of contemporary issues, and they can demonstrate how the UN is able to adopt 
policies to evade responsibility.  
 Case studies will be used to evaluate how the issue of responsibility has worked in 
practice, and the difficulties with it. The cholera incident in Haiti will demonstrate the need to 
evaluate the immunity granted to the UN. And the conditionality policy adopted in relation to 
MONUC’s activity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) shows how leverage over 
a host state to comply with international law can also be a way to avoid responsibility. Lastly, 
an analysis of ‘effective control’ as the threshold for attribution of conduct will show whether 
the threshold is too high to attribute the conduct of peacekeepers to the UN thereby not caus-
ing responsibility, or whether it is in fact the appropriate solution.  
 
1.4 Definitions and distinctions 
Throughout this thesis terms such as responsibility, accountability, attribution of conduct and 
attribution of responsibility will be used. It is important to separate these terms from each 
other as they have different meanings. 
  
1.4.1 Responsibility, accountability and liability 
The thesis examines how to hold the UN responsible, and how this might be more difficult in 
practice than in theory. Therefore, it is important to define what is meant by international le-
                                                
29  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p.331 
30  ibid., article 2.1(a) 
31  ibid. 
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gal responsibility. Traditionally, legal responsibility occurred when “there arises an Obliga-
tion by the Law of Nature to make Reparation for the Damage, if any be done”32 in response 
to an injury. Injury was a condition to entail responsibility. However, today, international re-
sponsibility has been defined as “legal consequences arising from wrongful acts or omissions” 
and is “part of the broader concept of international accountability for wrongful acts”.33 Ac-
cording to this definition, no injury is needed to become responsible – the breach of the inter-
national obligation is sufficient.  
 Turning to accountability, the International Law Association (ILA) has addressed this 
concept, stating that it is “the duty to account for its exercise”34 and that it consists of three 
levels. The first level is “internal and external scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of poten-
tial and subsequent liability and/or responsibility”, while the second level is “tortious liability 
for injurious consequences arising out of acts or omissions not involving a breach of any rule 
of international and/or institutional law”. Finally, the third level is “responsibility arising out 
of acts or omissions which do constitute a breach of a rule of international and/or institutional 
law.”35 The focus of this thesis will be on international responsibility at the third level of ac-
countability. 
 While legal responsibility is, by its own definition, legal, accountability can be legal, 
political, administrative or financial.36 Therefore, accountability of IOs “is not limited to in-
ternational obligations binding on those organizations.”37 This means that accountability is 
broader than international legal responsibility.  
 The term ‘liability’ is often used interchangeably with responsibility but there is sup-
port for understanding liability as an obligation to provide reparation when there has been a 
breach of international law.38 This is the way the term will be used throughout this thesis. 
 	  
1.4.2 Attribution of conduct versus attribution of responsibility 
DARIO distinguishes between attribution of conduct and attribution of responsibility. Where-
as chapter II of DARIO part two concerns attribution of conduct, part five implicitly deals 
with attribution of responsibility. Since DARIO has separate chapters for attribution of con-
duct and attribution of responsibility, it suggests that there is a distinction between the two 
                                                
32  Grotius (1625), cited in Pellet (2010), p.5 
33  Kondoch (2010), p.515 
34  ILA, Final Report on Accountability of International Organizations, 2004, p.5 
35  ibid. 
36  ibid. 
37  Zwanenburg (2005), p.63 
38  Nollkaemper (2011), pp.88-89 
7 
 
concepts.39 Furthermore, attribution of conduct is an element in an internationally wrongful 
act of an IO.40 
 Attribution of conduct has been described as “a legal operation, addressing the factual 
link between the conduct and the state or international organization through a normative ap-
proach”.41 The ILC laid down “effective control” in DARIO article 7 as being the appropriate 
threshold for attribution of conduct of state organs temporarily placed under IOs. 
 It has been explained that “attribution of responsibility involves independent acts of 
multiple parties causing a collective injury, whereas attribution of conduct often but not nec-
essarily, will involve the situation of a single wrongdoer.”42 Whether there is a possibility for 
multiple attribution of conduct will be examined. Organizations can also be responsible for 
the conduct of its member states. As Gaja stated: “It may well be that an organization under-
takes an obligation in circumstances in which compliance depends on the conduct of its mem-
ber states.”43 
 
1.5 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
After completing its work on ARSIWA in 2001, in 2002 the ILC turned to the law on respon-
sibility for IOs, with Giorgio Gaja as the Special Rapporteur.44 The work, known as DARIO, 
was completed in 2011.  
 
1.5.1 Codification or progressive development? Resemblance to ARSIWA. 
According to article 1 of the ILC Statute,45 the ILC’s work should focus on either codifying 
international law or promote the progressive development of it. Article 15 of the ILC Statute 
explains that: 
 
“In the following articles the expression “progressive development of international 
law” is used for convenience as meaning the preparation of draft conventions on 
subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to 
which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States. 
Similarly, the expression “codification of international law” is used for conven-
ience as meaning the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of in-
ternational law in fields where there already has been extensive State practice, 
precedent and doctrine.” 
                                                
39  Fry (2014), p.104 
40  DARIO article 4 
41  Fry (2014), p.106 
42  ibid., p.104 
43  A/CN.4/541 (2004), para.11 
44  A/57/10 (2002) 
45   Adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947 
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The distinction between codification and progressive development can be difficult to 
maintain since there may be uncertainty as to whether a rule already existed or was developed 
in the process.46 The ILC noted the lack of practice regarding responsibility for organizations, 
thus making DARIO more a document of progressive development rather than codification of 
existing norms.47 
 DARIO follows the same approach as ARSIWA, however DARIO is an “autonomous 
text” meaning that the articles in DARIO have been studied from the perspective of IOs even 
though the wording and approach is similar to ARSIWA.48 As Gaja explained: “[t]he articles 
on the responsibility of international organizations are not based on any presumption that the 
rules on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts are generally applicable 
to international organizations” but “a certain number of rules have been considered by the 
Commission to apply both to States and international organizations.”49  
 DARIO is meant to be general and applicable to all IOs even though there are consid-
erable differences between IOs in terms of functions and activities carried out. However, 
some articles are more relevant to certain organizations. DARIO article 21 on self-defense as 
a circumstance precluding wrongfulness may apply to a few organizations depending on their 
functions.50 Self-defense and necessity would be especially important to the UN during POs. 
 
1.5.2 Three sets of rules regarding attribution of conduct 
Messineo explains that the attribution of conduct to IOs, “rests on three basic pillars”. These 
are rules concerning “institutional links”, “factual links” and that a state or an organization 
“may adopt a certain conduct as its own after the conduct has taken place.”51 
 The rules regarding the institutional links concern organs or persons whose conduct is 
attributed to the state or organization automatically. This will be, for example, state organs 
and the organization’s organs52, or organs “exercising IO functions”.53 If there are such insti-
tutional links before the conduct is carried out, the conduct, even ultra vires conduct54, will be 
attributed to the state or organization. Although the conduct will automatically be attributed to 
the organization, off-duty and private conduct will not be.  
                                                
46  Murphy (2013), p.31 
47  DARIO commentaries p.2 
48  ibid. 
49  Gaja (2014), p.4 
50  ibid., p.3 
51  Messineo (2012), pp.7-10 
52  DARIO article 6; ARSIWA article 4 
53  Messineo (2012), p.8; DARIO article 6 
54  DARIO article 8 
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 The rules concerning factual links are when a person “is acting under the instructions, 
direction or control of a state/IO”.55 The conduct will be attributed to that organization if the 
instructions are given by an agent institutionally linked to it. The control or direction must be 
“effective” for the conduct to be attributed to the organization.56 The meaning of the term 
‘effective’ will be addressed later in the thesis. 
 Lastly, attribution of conduct to an organization or a state can happen when the organ-
ization or state adopts “a certain conduct as its own after the conduct has taken place (ex post 
facto)”.57 The conduct must be approved by an official of the state or the organization in order 
for it to be considered adopted. 
 
1.6 Assessing international responsibility 
DARIO article 3 states that “Every internationally wrongful act of an international organization 
entails the international responsibility of that organization.” International responsibility can be de-
fined as the “legal consequences arising from wrongful acts or omissions”.58 The wrongful act 
must be a breach of an international obligation.  
 According to the commentaries to DARIO article 1, the organization will be responsi-
ble for internationally wrongful acts it commits, and if the organization assists or aids another 
organization or a state in conducting an internationally wrongful act.59 It is questionable 
whether the UN can, for example, be seen as an accomplice to the Congolese forces when 
they have committed internationally wrongful acts and the peacekeepers have a mandate to 
assist the government.60 Therefore there are two types of responsibility: direct responsibility 
when the UN and its peacekeepers commit breaches of international law, and indirect respon-
sibility when the UN aids or assists others in breaching international law. 
 Accountability for IOs is important to make sure victims are acknowledged and can be 
compensated for the offenses they have experienced. The UN has admitted responsibility for 
its peacekeepers. The first time was in relation to the UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC) 
when the Secretary-General settled claims with Belgium and other states as compensation to 
their respective nationals who had suffered damage.61 Also, the UN accepted responsibility 
for an accident that happened to a British helicopter in Cyprus at the disposal of UNFICYP, 
                                                
55  Messineo (2012), p.8 
56  DARIO article 7 
57  Messineo (2012), p.10; DARIO article 9; ARSIWA article 11 
58  Kondoch (2010), p.515. 
59  DARIO commentaries, p.4 
60  Chapter 4.1 
61  Letter from Secretary-General 20 February 1965, United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1965), Part One 
Chapter II, p.39; A/CN.4/SER.A/2004/Add.1 (Part 1), p.11, para.35 
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and it was stated that “third-party claims should normally be expected to be addressed to the 
United Nations.”62  
Although DARIO lays down rules for responsibility and attribution of conduct, and 
the UN has accepted responsibility in the past, it is not always easy to assess responsibility in 
practice. This is evident in relation to POs which have a complicated command and control 
structure. 
 
2 Peace operations 
There is no official definition of POs. Although the UN Charter (Charter) does not mention 
POs explicitly, the preamble to the Charter and article 1 state that one of the purposes of the 
UN is to “maintain international peace and security”.63 This is to be achieved by taking “ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace”.64 This, com-
bined with the development and use of POs, provide the operations with the necessary legali-
ty. 
 
2.1 Development of peace operations 
POs are operations mandated by the UN Security Council, or by a regional organization act-
ing in compliance with the Charter. Troops are contributed to the operations by member states 
on a voluntary basis.  
 The legal basis of POs lies implicitly in the Charter, customary law and consent (in 
operations that have the consent of the host state). The purposes of POs are to promote, main-
tain and restore international peace and security. The ICJ confirmed the legality of POs in the 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations advisory opinion.65 The ICJ stated that “when the 
Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfill-
ment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action 
is not ultra vires the Organization.”66 The ICJ’s findings and the interpretation of the Charter 
provide sufficient basis for the legality of POs. 
 Over the decades, the number of POs increased as have the number of responsibilities 
which they undertake. The first peacekeeping operation, UNTSO, was established to monitor 
ceasefires and prevent hostilities.67 These peacekeepers were unarmed, meant to observe only, 
and were seen as peacekeepers in the traditional sense.  
                                                
62  United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1980), pp.184-185, cited in Gaja, Second Report 2004, p.11 
63  Charter article 1 
64  ibid. 
65   Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 
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 The first time that armed military personnel were used in a peacekeeping operation 
was in the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) in Egypt.68 The use of armed military per-
sonnel raised the question of the lawfulness of the use of force in self-defense, and the model 
of the use of force only in self-defense, which was developed in UNEF, served as a model for 
operations to come. From UNEF, the norm of self-defense changed from a strict understand-
ing of the term to “defense of the mission”.69 Furthermore, the mandates of POs have become 
more ambitious and all-inclusive: from, for example, strictly monitoring the truce between 
Israel and Arab states in UNTSO, to undertake humanitarian activities as in Cyprus (UN-
FICYP)70, and to monitor elections as in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).71 
 The increased use of force as self-defense was developed in operations such as the 
first major peace enforcement operation in Congo (ONUC)72, to UNFICYP and Lebanon.73 
Troops were authorized to use force in situations other than situations of strict self-defense. 
While peacekeeping operations were meant to deal with inter-State conflicts, today, UN 
peacekeeping “has been increasingly applied to intra-State conflicts and civil wars.”74 This 
challenges the founding principle of impartiality. The increased use of force and the expan-
sion of mandates, tasks and duties have also increased the potential for transgressions com-
mitted by peacekeepers and therefore the increased need for rules for international responsi-
bility as well as effective remedies.   
 
2.2 Different categories of peace operations 
There are different types of POs. One can make a distinction between enforcement and peace 
enforcement operations on one hand, and peace operations on the other. While the former 
operations are meant to enforce the will of the international community and are not dependent 
upon consent, the latter operations are based upon the principles of consent, impartiality and 
limited use of force.75  
 
2.2.1 Enforcement and peace enforcement operations 
Enforcement and peace enforcement operations are operations mandated by the Security 
Council under chapter VII of the Charter. These operations are “intended and mandated to 
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impose the will of the international community ‘by all necessary means’ on the other”.76 Fur-
thermore, these operations are not governed by the principles that govern peacekeeping opera-
tions. 
 Enforcement and peace enforcement operations do not require the consent of the main 
parties, and may use force, which is normally prohibited under article 2(4) of the Charter.77 
However, whereas enforcement operations are in a way “UN mandated war-fighting opera-
tions designed to impose a military solution” in response to breaches of international peace, 
peace enforcement operations are not so “far-reaching in terms of its objectives or involve-
ment in an armed conflict”78 and will “seek to maintain the maximum consent”79 of the parties 
to the conflict. These types of operations are often conducted under the command of a State 
on the basis of a UN mandate. 
 
2.2.2 Peacekeeping operations 
Peacekeeping operations are often mandated under Chapter VI of the Charter and often lead 
by the UN itself. However, it has become increasingly common for peacekeeping operations 
to be mandated under chapter VII.80 Peacekeeping operations rely upon the principles of con-
sent; impartiality; and limited use of force.81 The three principles are “inter-related and mutu-
ally reinforcing”82 and will be examined in turn. 
 Firstly, consent: Consent of the host state is important to make peacekeeping opera-
tions as successful as possible, and make it easier for peacekeepers to perform their mandated 
duties. Without consent it is difficult to see peacekeepers as impartial, and they might be seen 
as a party to the conflict. The consent of the TCCs is also important and can be withdrawn at 
any point, the same would be possible for the host state. 
 Secondly, impartiality: The principle of impartiality is of crucial importance to gain 
the trust of the parties to the conflict and to maintain their consent. The peacekeeping forces 
“must implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any party” but should not be 
“neutral in the execution of their mandate.”83 Impartiality differs from inactivity or neutrality. 
While neutrality means “to take no sides in hostilities or engage, at any time, in controversies 
of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature”, impartiality means “being guided solely 
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by needs, making no discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, gender, class or reli-
gious/political beliefs”.84 
 Thirdly, limited use of force, which means that peacekeepers should not use force, 
unless it is in self-defense, or in the defense of the mandate.85 The duties of the peacekeepers 
have expanded since the first peacekeeping operation, and as mentioned, the lawfulness of the 
use of force has expanded through POs over time. However, the use of force should always be 
a last resort. 
 In situations where peacekeepers are in presence of rebels, militias or other threats, the 
Security Council has given a so-called “robust” mandate authorizing the use of “all necessary 
means” to prevent forceful attempts to disturb the peace and to protect civilians.86 Although 
given a robust mandate, peacekeeping operations are separate from peace enforcement opera-
tions mandated under chapter VII of the Charter. 
 
2.3 Creation of a peace operation 
The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security,87 and decides when to establish a PO on an ad hoc basis. The Security Council eval-
uates the situation, and determines, for example, if it is a threat to international peace and se-
curity, the existence of a cease-fire, whether the parties commit to a peace process, the safety 
of UN personnel, and whether a precise mandate can be expressed.88 Establishing a PO can 
take a long time, however the success and credibility of the operation may depend on rapid 
deployment.89 
 The Secretary-General will prepare a report based on consultations with Member 
States and the potential host state as well as analyses of the territory of security, politics, hu-
manitarian issues, and implications of the possible operations.90 The Security Council will 
then evaluate and decide if an operation should be established. Each operation has its own 
mandate, and the Security Council Resolution will provide the legal basis and the framework. 
Since the UN does not have its own armed force, it is reliant on voluntary troop con-
tributions from member states. Prior to the deployment, the UN and the TCCs agree to a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or a formal Transfer of Authority (TOA) agreement. 
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The TOA or MOU will define the level of authority transferred to the UN, typically opera-
tional command and/or control.91 
 When the operation relies on host state consent, the UN enters a Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) with the host state. This agreement is the basis for the immunity of indi-
vidual peacekeepers and will regulate the legal relationship between the peacekeepers and the 
host state. Furthermore, the SOFA clarifies that the TCCs will retain criminal jurisdiction over 
its contingents.92  
 
2.4 Command and control in peace operations 
The power to exercise authority over and direct the actions of armed forces is related to com-
mand and control.93 The highest level of decision-making and management lies with the Secu-
rity Council and the Department of Peacekeeping at the UN Headquarters. It is here that deci-
sions are made at a strategic level.  
 Underneath is the operational level, which is comprised of the management at the 
Mission’s Headquarters. It is here that objectives and plans from the strategic level are formu-
lated into plans for operating in the field. The UN has defined ‘operational control’ as: 
 
“The authority granted to a military commander, in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations, to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish spe-
cific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a 
combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel ... United Na-
tions Operational Control includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub 
units of a contingent, as required by the operational necessities, within the mission 
area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as ap-
proved by the United Nations Headquarters.”94 
 
The UN Force Commander has operational command and control over the entire 
Force and answers to the Head of Mission (HOM) who is in charge of conducting the 
mission. 
 The daily management of the operations below the Mission Headquarters is the tacti-
cal level of command and control. At the tactical level, command and control relate to the 
detailed “direction and control of movements” to carry out specific duties.95 The TCCs still 
have tactical control and command but will designate a tactical level commander who will be 
a representative for the TCC and exercise tactical control and command over the contingents 
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from the TCC in question.96 This means that the command and control (“C2” in military 
terms) is structured as a hierarchy; national contingents, lead by a national contingent com-
mander, are under the command of the UN representatives in the field. The commander in 
chief is under the command and control of the Secretary-General who is under the Security 
Council on top of the hierarchy. 
 There are several components in the field in UN peacekeeping operations: military, 
police and civilian. These components are under the operational authority of the HOM.97 The 
HOM will typically be a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and a Force Com-
mander. The Force Commander works as a link between the national contingents and the 
UN98, and has the operational control over the peacekeepers from the TCCs, while the TCC 
will keep full command. Full command means the authority to determine whether armed forc-
es will participate in an operation, and to withdraw from the operation.99  
 In enforcement or peace enforcement operations, the Security Council will lay out the 
objective of the operation in the mandate and delegate the operational level command to a 
specific state or organization while still retain the overall political authority and responsibil-
ity.100 Whereas, in peacekeeping operations, the TCCs retain full command over its armed 
forces but will transfer authority at the level of operational command or control to the UN.101 
 The UN may exercise operational level command but this does not mean actual au-
thority or responsibility for acts by armed forces. As stated “[i]t should be remembered that 
the multilayered levels of authority range from the general to the specific and simply because 
a particular act or failure to act is carried out under UN Security Council mandate does not 
signify that it is an act attributable to the UN.”102 
 
3 Criteria for international responsibility for the UN 
In order for the UN to be held responsible for an internationally wrongful act, several criteria 
must be fulfilled. Shaw states that “[r]esponsibility is a necessary consequence of internation-
al personality”.103 Therefore, the first criterion is that the UN must possess a legal personality 
in international law separate from its Member States. Second, there must be a breach of an 
international obligation.104 Lastly, the conduct in question must be attributable to the UN.105 
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These criteria will be explored in more detail. 
3.1 The UN’s legal personality 
According to Brownlie, international responsibility is a “question inseparable from that of 
legal personality in all its forms”.106 Thus, whether or not the UN has a legal personality is 
essential if it is to be held responsible for its actions. 
 This question was considered in the Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion107, 
where the ICJ found that the UN possesses legal personality and thus has rights and duties 
under international law. In this Advisory Opinion the personality was “inferred from the pow-
ers or purposes of the organization and its practice”.108 Without legal personality, the UN 
would not be able to achieve its purpose and goals.  
 Peacekeeping operations as subsidiary organs of the Security Council which functions 
as the mandating organ, also have legal personality.109 Furthermore, in the Cumaraswamy 
Advisory Opinion, the ICJ stated that the UN can be held responsible for internationally 
wrongful acts and can be required to pay compensation.110 This is considered to be customary 
international law.111 According to the UN Secretariat, the UN’s legal personality will, in prin-
ciple entail responsibility for any violations of international law committed by UN peace-
keepers as a subsidiary organ for the UN.112  
 
3.2 Breach of an international obligation 
The second criterion for responsibility is that there has been a breach of an international obli-
gation through an act or an omission.113 For an omission to be a violation of international law, 
there must be a duty to act which the organization has not fulfilled.114 On the other hand, a 
breach of an international obligation through an act is therefore a violation of an obligation 
not to act or not to act in that particular way.115 An example of an omission is the Genocide 
case116 where Serbia, through omissions, was found by the ICJ to have violated the duty to 
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prevent genocide at Srebrenica. The cholera epidemic in Haiti can be seen as a breach of the 
do no harm principle,117 but also as a failure to exercise due diligence to prevent possible epi-
demics. 
While rules regarding the different international obligations are referred to as primary 
rules, the consequences of breaching these rules are known as the secondary rules.118 Interna-
tional obligations can result from customary international law, treaties binding the organiza-
tion, or other obligations in international law binding on IOs. The ICJ stated that organiza-
tions “are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international 
law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties”.119   
UN peacekeeping forces are seen as subsidiary organs of the UN – either of the Secu-
rity Council or the General Assembly. This raises the question of whether IHL and IHRL ap-
ply to peacekeeping forces. Despite having international legal personality, the UN is not a 
party to any IHL or IHRL conventions. However, it is “not difficult to apply customary rules 
of IHL since such rules are binding on all states and therefore, all states participating in UN 
forces are in any case bound by them.”120 
IHL will, as a rule, apply in enforcement operations121, but when it comes to peace en-
forcement or peacekeeping operations it will be “determined on a case-by-case basis in the 
light of the factual environment and the operationalization of the mandate for the operation in 
question within that environment.”122 Furthermore, the UN considers IHL applicable to 
“United Nations forces conducting operations under United Nations command and con-
trol”.123 The applicability of IHL conventions is confirmed in several SOFAs and the UN 
Model Agreement between UN and TCCs.124 This combined with other official UN docu-
ments and reports make it clear that IHL conventions are applicable to UN forces.125 When 
there is an armed conflict as defined in common articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and article 1 of Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, IHL will apply. 
Since the beginning of peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping troops have been ex-
pected to protect civilians from massacres and crimes against humanity.126 Unfortunately, 
these expectations have not always been met. After the failure of peacekeepers to protect ci-
vilians in the 1990s during the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia, the Security Council adopt-
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ed a resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict where it expressed the “will-
ingness to consider how peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of 
armed conflict on civilians”.127 Since this resolution, the protection of civilians has been ex-
plicitly mentioned in peacekeeping mandates, although it is stated as being the responsibility 
of the host State’s government.128  
 Even if the mandate of a peacekeeping operation does not contain an express provision 
regarding the protection of civilians, “peacekeepers … who witness violence against civilians 
should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United 
Nations principles”.129 In order to protect civilians, the peacekeepers should “be given the 
specific resources needed to carry out that mandate.”130 This has been acknowledged by the 
Security Council.131 Despite having an obligation to protect civilians, even if it requires  
peacekeepers to use force, “[t]here is a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not in-
tervening with force when civilians are under attack.”132 Peacekeepers use force to protect 
civilians when it is also used as self-defense of the peacekeepers themselves or UN proper-
ty.133 This can damage the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission if they fail to protect the 
local population.134 
 Human rights is an important issue at the UN. The UN cannot become a party to hu-
man rights treaties. However, it is nevertheless bound by customary human rights law due to 
its international legal personality.135 Furthermore, “[a]ll staff in peace operations have the 
responsibility to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights through their work.”136 
Human rights are often mentioned in peacekeeping mandates. For example, the mandate to 
the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, stated that the operation was to “ensure protection of 
civilians” and to “assist in the promotion and protection of human rights”.137  
3.3 The conduct is attributable to the UN 
Lastly, for the UN to be internationally responsible, the wrongful act must be “attributable to” 
the UN.138 The test of attribution of conduct in question is “effective control” as specified in 
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DARIO article 7, which provides that: 
 
The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organi-
zation that is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be 
considered under international law an act of the latter organization if the organiza-
tion exercises effective control over that conduct.139 
 
As I will explain, the level of command and control remaining with the TCCs might make it 
problematic for the UN to actually exercise “effective control” over POs, depending on how 
“effective control” is defined and understood. If the UN does not have effective control over 
the conduct, it cannot be attributed to the UN and therefore the UN will not bear responsibil-
ity.  
Moreover, DARIO article 8 states that in order for the acts to be attributable to the 
UN, the acts must have been performed while acting “in an official capacity and within the 
overall functions of that organization”.140 Article 8 also states that ultra vires acts, meaning 
acts exceeding the authority of the agent or organ, under the official capacity of the organiza-
tion will still be attributable to the organization. 
 
4 International responsibility for the UN: easily avoided?  
In theory, it should be easy to hold the UN responsible: the UN has legal personality and 
when it has effective control over conduct that is in breach of an international obligation – the 
UN is responsible and obligated to make reparations. However, in practice, it is not as easy as 
it seems. The UN has the ability to adopt policies to ensure its own compliance with interna-
tional law, but the policies can also be seen as a way to evade responsibility. Furthermore, the 
UN has jurisdictional immunity and can therefore, even if being considered responsible, avoid 
any obligations to make reparations. Lastly, the threshold for attribution of conduct, as cur-
rently construed, is perhaps not the best test since the command and control structure can in-
terfere with UN’s effective control over its peacekeepers.  
 
4.1 The conditionality policy as a way to ensure compliance and steer 
clear of DARIO article 14: the DRC 
The UN promotes international peace, security and human rights. The UN does not want to 
violate international law by aiding or assisting an internationally wrongful act thereby being 
an accomplice which will negatively affect the UN’s credibility. The UN’s ability to adopt 
resolutions and policies can be used as leverage to steer states in the right direction. However, 
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this ability can also enable the UN to avoid being held responsible. 
 DARIO chapter IV regards responsibility for organizations “in connection with the act 
of a State or another international organization”. DARIO article 14 is therefore a rule regard-
ing dual attribution of responsibility and not one of attribution of conduct. If the peacekeepers 
carry out unlawful acts themselves, then that will raise the issue of attribution of conduct to 
the organization or the TCCs, therefore being a question of direct responsibility. This, howev-
er, is when the peacekeepers help others carry out unlawful acts without taking part in the 
conduct themselves. As seen in chapter 1.6 of this thesis, this is indirect responsibility. 
 DARIO article 14 provides that: 
 
“An international organization which aids or assists a State or another international 
organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or 
the latter organization is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
(a) the organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the interna-
tionally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organization.” 
If these two cumulative criteria are met – the UN will be considered internationally responsi-
ble. DARIO article 14 closely resembles ARSIWA article 16, which is considered to be cus-
tomary international law.141 DARIO article 14 is also meant to represent customary law.142 
 According to DARIO article 14(b), the UN would have to be bound by the same rule 
as the main actor in order to be considered responsible. For example, the DRC is bound by 
IHL and IHRL as it is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, their two Additional Proto-
cols, and has ratified most of the human rights treaties143 and is also bound by international 
customary law. As explained, the UN is bound by IHL and IHRL so in the case of peacekeep-
ing in the DRC, this criteria would be fulfilled since the UN is bound by the same obligations 
as the DRC. Additionally, peacekeepers must comply with local laws and regulations which 
include international obligations of the DRC.144 
 Additionally, the wording of article 14(b) shows that an act is required for responsibil-
ity to be attributed to the UN. The criteria in article 14(b) will not be fulfilled if the peace-
keepers aid or assist someone who has committed war crimes in the past. Only if the peace-
keepers assist in actual conduct of an internationally wrongful act will it entail responsibility. 
 The requirement of “knowledge” as stated in article 14(a) is a subjective criterion.  
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The ILC refers to the commentary for ARSIWA article 16 which states that it is the intent to 
“facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct and the internationally wrongful conduct is 
actually committed by the aided or assisted State”.145 This criterion has been criticized and 
debated in literature seeing as the intent is impossible to prove.146 The commentaries also ex-
plain that the aid or assistance should be significant in order to entail responsibility.147 The 
condition of the aid or assistance being significant has been questioned. What would amount 
to significant assistance? Should it not be sufficient that the organization is assisting or aiding 
at all?148 The aid or assistance, fulfilling the criteria of knowledge, should be wrongful in it-
self. Therefore, if the UN exercises effective control over a PO which aids or assists a state or 
another organization in committing an internationally wrongful act, the conduct can be at-
tributed to the UN and therefore also responsibility. 
 As many peacekeeping operations have developed from traditional monitoring to be 
given the mandate to use all necessary means to achieve its purpose, the protection of civil-
ians has now become “part of the core obligations within peacekeeping missions.”149 For a PO 
to be successful and seem legitimate, protecting civilians is of crucial importance. Although 
the main responsibility of protecting civilians is with the parties to the conflict,150 the civilians 
expect to be protected when there is a PO in the area. Therefore it is important that the peace-
keepers are considered impartial and not as an accomplice to attacks on the civilian popula-
tion. 
 After belonging to Belgium for many years, Congo became independent in 1960 and 
has since then been troubled by several conflicts. The first UN operation in Congo (ONUC) 
was established in 1960 and lasted for four years. Initially, ONUC was meant to ensure the 
withdrawal of Belgian forces and provide assistance151 but the mandate was expanded to pre-
vent civil war, maintain Congo’s independence and authorized ONUC to use force as a last 
resort to achieve its mandate.152 
 In 1999 another PO was established, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC).153 The mission was intended to monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agree-
ment between the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe but over time the 
Security Council expanded the mandate. With a chapter VII mandate, MONUC has the au-
                                                
145  DARIO commentaries p.37, para (4); ARSIWA commentaries, p.66, para.(5) 
146  Aust (2014), p.8, footnotes 32 and 33 
147  DARIO commentaries p.37 
148  Reinisch (2001), p.71 
149  Breau (2013), p.78, see e.g. S/PRST/2013/2, pp.4-5 
150  S/2013/689, para.4 
151   S/Res/143 (1960)  
152   S/Res/161 (1961), para.1  
153  S/Res/1279 (1999) 
22 
 
thorization to use force to protect civilians154 as well as assisting the government and the 
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). After MONUC was una-
ble to prevent the killings of civilians at Goma, protection of civilians is now the top priori-
ty.155 In 2010, MONUC was renamed the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and protection of civilians is still the first priori-
ty.156 
 Despite having received a lot of criticism for the failure to protect civilians, it is im-
portant to remember the mission’s achievements as well, such as when MONUSCO’s Force 
Intervention Brigade helped defeat the March 23 Movement (M23), a rebel military group, in 
2013.157 On a more recent occasion, Martin Kobler, Chief of MONUSCO, was happy with the 
successful FARDC-MONUSCO operation against Front National de Libération (FNL), a Bu-
rundian armed group.158 Notwithstanding the massive criticism, without the PO, the situation 
in the DRC would probably be worse. 
 It is undisputed that the situation in the DRC is tragic when seen from a human rights 
perspective. Civilians are attacked, sexually abused and killed by rebel forces as well as by 
FARDC.159 There have been severe violations of IHL and IHRL. In 2009 and 2010 two opera-
tions, Kimia II and Amani Leo, were established as joint FARDC/MONUC military opera-
tions to eliminate the foreign rebel group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberations of Rwan-
da (FDLR).160 MONUC was providing logistical support and occasional fire support, making 
some civilians consider MONUC as the FARDC’s accomplice.161 And MONUC has been 
criticized for failing to protect civilians as well as providing assistance to the FARDC when 
they continue to violate international law. The FDLR was reduced by half during Kimia II, 
but civilians had been attacked by the FARDC.162 Can the UN be seen as an accomplice to 
these actions?  
 With a mandate to assist the FARDC, the UN would be at risk of becoming responsi-
ble for the actions of the DRC forces pursuant to the principles in DARIO article 14. After the 
events during Kimia II, the Security Council adopted the ‘conditionality policy’ in 2009.163 
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The policy means that MONUC/MONUSCO will only take part and assist the DRC govern-
ment in operations on the condition that it will not violate international law. It is up to the 
FARDC to evaluate and remove officers if they still wish to receive MONUSCO support. 
This policy can be seen as a method to ensure compliance with international law but also as a 
way to steer clear of responsibility after the principles in DARIO article 14, and the policy is 
not without criticism. It has been stated that the conditionality policy “emerges from a need 
for damage-control by the UN, to protect itself from moral, political and potentially legal lia-
bility for the substantial war crimes and abuses of FARDC elements who benefit from UN 
support.”164 Also, it is argued that “the policy lays the groundwork to deny direct UN respon-
sibility for future war crimes or crimes against humanity by avoiding a situation in which it 
knowingly supports military action by known violators.”165  
 The conditionality policy aspires to eliminate violations of international law. It laid the 
basis for the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP)166 which applies not only to 
peacekeepers, but to all UN entities engaged in support activities.167 The HRDDP lays down 
the procedures and how to effectively implement it in the work of the entities.  
 The conditionality policy has lead to MONUC withholding support to the FARDC in 
some instances168 and to the cooperation between MONUC and the FARDC in pre-screening 
and clearing commanders taking part in joint operations.169 However, the policy has also led 
to some criticism concerning the relationship between MONUSCO and the FARDC seeing as 
the leverage MONUSCO has can cause friction between the two and disturb the diplomatic 
influence MONUSCO has.170 In effect, the FARDC can still carry out operations without 
MONUSCO support and in that way still be able to violate IHL and IHRL. It has also been 
argued that it is too easy for the FARDC to get around the conditionality policy: ”The 
FARDC have interpreted Amani Leo’s conditionality policy in a way that does not oblige 
them to vet officers involved in operations if their rank is higher than battalion command-
er.”171 This enables senior FARDC officers to participate in Amani Leo even though they 
could be suspected for war crimes.  
 By approaching the policy in a way that does not require any commanders to withdraw 
from operations, and also by carrying out operations without MONUSCO support, the intend-
ed leverage over the FARDC is in reality not as great as intended. Instead of ensuring 
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FARDC’s compliance with international law it can be seen as a way for the UN to not be held 
directly responsible by simply not participating in those operations and being selective as to 
when and where to give support. The top priority for MONUSCO is to protect civilians, 
which means also in situations when the civilians are attacked by the Congolese army. This 
can cause strain between the parties, and the desire to avoid such tension may lead to inactivi-
ty in regards to the mandate.  
 If MONUSCO is aware of the approach the FARDC has to the conditionality policy, 
and continues to support (aid or assist significantly) operations which involve violations of 
international law – that would fulfill the criteria of knowledge and assistance, as laid down in 
DARIO article 14, thus making the UN responsible.  
 
4.2 Jurisdictional immunity: denying responsibility and effective remedy in 
Haiti 
In addition to the ability to adopt resolutions and policies making the issue of responsibility 
difficult, the UN also has broad jurisdictional immunity before judicial entities, adding further 
complications to the issue. The difficulties which can arise with this can be seen in the case of 
Haiti. 
 The UN has been involved in Haiti for a long time. In 1990, the UN was requested by 
the provisional Government to observe the elections, and sent an Observer Group for the Ver-
ification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH). After the coup of the President and the deterio-
ration of the situation, the UN set up the first peacekeeping operation – the UN Mission in 
Haiti (UNMIH).172 Between 1994 and 2000, the UN established several peacekeeping mis-
sions such as the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the UN Transition Mission in Hai-
ti (UNTMIH), and the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).173 
 In the beginning of 2004 armed conflict broke out in the country. The Security Coun-
cil established the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a response to the threat 
to international peace and security.174 This mission was given a mandate including both 
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.175 When the earthquake struck Haiti in January 
2010, the mandate was further expanded to enable the mission to address the crisis.176 In Oc-
tober 2010, peacekeepers from MINUSTAH leaked raw sewage into Haiti’s largest river sys-
tem spreading cholera across the country. The disease has infected over 690,000 and has 
killed over 8500 people.177  
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 MINUSTAH operates under a Chapter VII mandate and it includes the duty to secure 
a stable environment and to assist in the promotion of human rights.178 The right to clean wa-
ter has been acknowledged by the UN Human Rights Council as a human right deriving “from 
the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably related to the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right to life and human digni-
ty”.179 Contamination of drinking water causing an epidemic as in Haiti is in breach of the 
right to life and the right against arbitrary deprivation of life, the right to clean water, and 
highest attainable standard of health.180 The sanitation system at the MINUSTAH camp was 
inadequate181 and the Nepalese peacekeepers who were overseeing the camp were not tested 
for cholera even though there had been recent cholera outbreak in Nepal.182 
 Despite scientific evidence showing the UN was responsible, the UN has denied re-
sponsibility and effective remedy for the victims. The UN has relied on a 2011 study which 
concluded that there was no clear scientific evidence as to what caused the outbreak. The re-
search was conducted by a UN Independent Panel of Experts. However, the experts have 
since then changed their conclusion and stated that scientific evidence today concludes that 
MINUSTAH troops caused the epidemic.183 In this case the harm was caused by negligence 
by both the UN and the TCC seeing as the main responsibility for testing the peacekeepers 
lies with the TCCs,184 but it is UN’s responsibility to process the information.185 
 It should be recalled that in 2001, Kofi Annan as the Secretary-General at the time, 
stated that the UN has international responsibility for its peacekeepers, and that responsibility 
includes “liability for damage caused by members of forces during the performance of their 
duties.”186  
 The issues of liability and immunity for the troops and UN personnel are addressed in 
the SOFA concluded in 2004 between the UN and Haiti.187 According to paragraph 55 of the 
Haitian SOFA, unless arising from operational necessity, “[t]hird-party claims for property 
loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death arising from or directly attributed to 
MINUSTAH … shall be settled by the United Nations”. Paragraph 55 of the agreement pro-
vides for the procedure; “any dispute or claim of a private-law character … shall be settled by 
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a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose.” No such commission has 
been established in Haiti or in any other UN peacekeeping missions.188 
 The UN has broad immunity before national and international courts. Article 105 of 
the Charter states that the organization and its officials and representatives have “such privi-
leges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes”.189 Furthermore, 
section 2 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations190 
(CPIUN) grants general immunity to the UN and its representatives, but also the opportunity 
for the UN to expressly waiver it. It is provided in section 29 that the UN: 
 
“shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: 
(a) Disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to 
which the United Nations is a party; 
(b) Disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his offi-
cial position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-
General.” 
 
Although the UN is granted immunity, and is therefore exempted from legal proceed-
ings in order to carry out its tasks, the UN is not granted impunity which would exempt the 
organization from injurious consequences. The UN itself has accepted that:  
 
“the immunity accorded to the United Nations by Article II of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and the immunity accorded to 
agents of the United Nations by Articles V and VI, is offset by an obligation in Ar-
ticle VIII to make remedies available to private parties who might otherwise be 
harmed by the immunity of the Organization and its agents.”191 
 
It is argued that the UN is in breach of the Haitian SOFA and the CPIUN. According to this 
agreement and convention, the UN is immune before courts but must also “provide to third 
parties certain mechanisms for holding it accountable if and when it engages in wrongdoing 
during peacekeeping operations.”192 Despite never having established a claims commission, 
the UN has in the past established a “local claims review board”, which is made up by UN 
personnel only.193 In the Secretary-General report, “lump-sum agreements” are mentioned.194 
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This is when the UN negotiates with the government on behalf of its nationals and it is up to 
the government to distribute the amount to its citizens. This occurred in the DRC when a 
lump-sum agreement was accepted in the Congo in relation to ONUC195. 
 None of these procedures of settlement have been used in relation to the cholera out-
break in Haiti. Consequently, the victims are denied effective remedy, such as restitution196 
and the guarantee of non-repetition,197 which is a right “well-established throughout interna-
tional human rights law”.198 
 In an effort to get some reparation, victims of the epidemic petitioned for adjudication 
and compensation in accordance with the SOFA for the damages they had suffered.199 It took 
over a year before the UN replied.200 In its response, the UN invoked immunity under section 
29 of the CPIUN, claiming that the question is a matter of public law rather than a private law 
claim seeing as they believe it raises political and policy issues.201 Immunity is the reason 
behind the obligation to establish a commission as a means to settle disputes. 
 Article 105 of the Charter grants the UN immunity in order to fulfill its purposes. The 
immunity granted is therefore based on operational necessity and functionality. Damage 
caused by operational necessity has been defined as “damage [which] results from necessary 
actions taken by a peacekeeping force in the course of carrying out its operations in pursuance 
of its mandate.”202 One cannot argue that the cholera outbreak occurred out of operational 
necessity, nor has the argument been raised.203 Furthermore, the letter from the UN does not 
explain why it should be seen as a public law matter rather than a private law claim. The 
claim was one of tort, the victims were private individuals and they sought monetary compen-
sation,204 indicating that it is in fact a claim arising from private law.  
 In October 2013, a lawsuit was filed against the UN in a New York Federal Court. The 
UN did not officially respond to the lawsuit but asked the US Government to seek dismissal 
of the case on the UN’s behalf.205 The US Government, as the UN’s host state, did so to pro-
tect the UN’s immunity. The oral pleadings took place ins October 2014 where the representa-
tive for the cholera victims argued that the UN failed to fulfill its obligation to establish a 
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claims commission both under the CPIUN and the Haitian SOFA. Therefore, the UN is not 
entitled to immunity. Secondly, it was argued that the UN violated the entire CPIUN since the 
UN did not provide a procedure to provide effective remedy, which is an integral part of the 
object and purpose of the CPIUN.206 
 Judge Oetken, of the US District Court, ruled in January 2015 that “the United Na-
tions, MINUSTAH, … are absolutely immune from suit in this Court”207 in the absence of an 
express waiver. The judge relied on Brzak v. United Nations where the plaintiffs claimed to 
have been sexually discriminated at their workplace by a UN official.208 The case was dis-
missed on the ground of immunity under the CPIUN, as was DeLuca V. United Nations where 
the UN withheld DeLuca’s tax monies and consequently made him unable to pay his income 
taxes.209 The immunity of UN subsidiary organs was also confirmed in in the Sadikoglu 
case.210 
 With absolute immunity, the UN is able to avoid responsibility and deny victims any 
form of reparation. This will lead to unjust results when the UN in fact causes damage, espe-
cially as seen in this case where MINUSTAH’s negligence led to thousands of victims. Fur-
thermore, one might ask how the UN can be bound by international law while it cannot be 
held responsible for violations. The legitimacy of the organization might be damaged if it 
consistently argues immunity in order not to be held responsible. This way of avoiding re-
sponsibility and effective remedy makes it clear that the privileges and immunities for the UN 
need to be addressed, and responsibility for IOs needs to be clearly laid out.  
 
4.3 DARIO article 7: ‘effective control’ – the correct threshold? 
The conduct must be attributable to the UN for it to entail responsibility. When the peace-
keepers are the ones conducting the act in question, DARIO article 7 has laid down “effective 
control” as the test for attribution of conduct. 
 The DARIO commentaries make a distinction between State organs transferred com-
pletely to an IO, and State organs that are still under control of the state while attached to the 
organization.211 The conduct of fully seconded organs is attributed to the organization under 
article 6. This would be attribution under the set of rules concerning “institutional links".212 
However, the conduct of not fully seconded organs will be based on the effective control test 
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as set out in article 7213 and fall under the rules concerning “factual links”.214 For the conduct 
to be attributed under article 7, the control must be effective but the organ/contingents must 
also be placed at the organization’s “disposal”. Therefore, two cumulative criteria must be 
fulfilled.215 
 ARSIWA contains the test of being under “direction or control” when assessing 
whether the conduct of a person or entity is attributable to the state.216 Being under the “direc-
tion or control” refers to the ‘effective control’ test as applied by the ICJ in the Nicaragua217 
and Genocide cases. It is not clear whether the ‘effective control’ test in ARSIWA is to be 
interpreted in the same way as in DARIO given the fact that ARSIWA concerns full attribu-
tion to one state, whereas DARIO concerns which entity the conduct should be attributed 
to.218 The DARIO commentaries do not clarify the content of the effective control test, how-
ever, the ILC argues against the ultimate control test as used by the ECtHR, saying that the 
test “hardly implies a role in the act in question.”219 The ILC further pointed out scholars who 
noted that the ECtHR did not use the effective control test as envisaged by the ILC, which 
indicates that the ILC disagrees with the ultimate control test.220 The “ultimate authority and 
control” test will be analyzed in chapter 5.3.1. 
 The DARIO commentaries point out that the test in article 7 is based on “the factual 
control that is exercised over the specific conduct taken by the organ or agent placed at the 
receiving organization’s disposal.”221 This is similar to that under ARSIWA article 8, which 
can indicate that the test is meant to be understood the same way.222  
 
4.3.1 Effective control as understood in case-law 
The effective control test has been interpreted and applied in several cases. I will first exam-
ine how it has been understood by the ICJ, then I will show its recognition by the ECtHR. 
Lastly, the domestic courts in the Netherlands have interpreted and applied the test on several 
occasions – and their understanding will also be examined.   
 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ was asked whether the conduct of the Contra forces, 
which rebelled against the Nicaraguan Government, were attributable to the United States. 
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The ICJ stated that in order to have exercised ‘effective control’ it was necessary that the 
United States “directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and 
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State”.223 The Contras had been financed, trained, 
and equipped by the United States,224 but that was insufficient to attribute some violations of 
IHL of the Contras to the United States by effective control. This indicates a high threshold 
for when the conduct is under the ‘effective control’ of a state or organization. The ICJ upheld 
the effective control test in the 2007 Genocide case225 after the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) used a different test of  “overall control” in the Tadic 
case.226 In the Genocide case, the ICJ had to determine whether the acts of members of the 
Army of the Republika Srpska could be attributed to the Serbia and Montenegro. The ICJ 
concluded that the acts could not be attributed to the State.227 
 Before the ECtHR, the ‘effective control’ test has been referred to in cases such as 
Behrami, Saramati228 and Al-Jedda229. However, in the Behrami and Saramati cases a differ-
ent test was applied - the “ultimate authority and control” test. This test has been criticized for 
lowering the threshold too much.230  
 Turning to domestic law, in the Nuhanovic case, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
concluded that the conduct of the Dutch troops during the Srebrenica massacre was attributa-
ble to the Netherlands based on an interpretation of the effective control test.231 The Nether-
lands was found responsible for the death of three men at Srebrenica. The Dutchbat did not 
evacuate them with the battalion, and they were killed by Bosnian-Serb army or related para-
military groups.232 The Court stated in relation to effective control that “the attribution of 
conduct to the seconding State or the international organization is based on the factual control 
over the specific conduct, in which all factual circumstances and the special context of the 
case must be taken into account.”233 
 The Court of Appeal in The Hague in its ruling in the Nuhanovic case234 stated that 
effective control   
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”does not only imply that significance should be given to the question whether that 
conduct constituted the execution of a specific instruction, issued by the UN or the 
State, but also to the question whether, if there was no such specific instruction, the 
UN or the State had the power to prevent the conduct concerned.”235 
 
This was not disputed in the Supreme Court. The entity with the ability to prevent the conduct 
will be seen as having effective control over the troops and the act or omission would be at-
tributed to that entity. 
 In another case, Mothers of Srebrenica Decision,236 the District Court of The Hague 
found the Netherlands responsible for 300 deaths during the Srebrenica massacre. The District 
Court looked at DARIO article 7 and stated that effective control is “factual control”237 and “it 
comes down to the actual say over specific action whereby all of the actual circumstances and 
the particular context of the case must be examined”.238 This interpretation is similar to the 
wording found in the Nuhanovic case. It has also been explained that in “UN military termi-
nology, ‘effective control’ equates to ‘effective command and control’, also referred to as 
‘operational control’.”239 
 Although DARIO might not have as much weight as ARSIWA, these cases and the 
fact that several scholars have supported the principle, give article 7 and the effective control 
test noteworthy weight.240 
 
4.3.2 Difficulties with effective control in practice 
Even though the idea of having effective control over a certain conduct seems straightfor-
ward, it is not without complications in practice. In this context, there has to be a distinction 
between having effective control over territory and effective control over specific conduct. 
While the former is a matter of jurisdiction over territory, thus falling outside the scope of this 
thesis, the latter is a question of attribution of conduct.241 
 The “effective control” test set out in article 7 does not encompass the intricacies 
which occur with POs.242 This is more evident if it is possible with dual or multiple attribution 
of conduct. In practice it can be difficult to establish who had, and what amounts to, effective 
control over specific conduct. As explained above, the TCCs retain a certain level of control 
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over their troops. They can withdraw from the operation at any time and can object to changes 
in deployment of their troops. They also have exclusive criminal, disciplinary and administra-
tive jurisdiction. The TCCs can agree to the details of the engagement before the placement of 
the troops. Does this mean that the UN does not exercise effective control over peacekeepers? 
Or does this open the possibility for dual or joint control? 
 National contingents are supposed to be under UN control but as Murphy states; 
“[t]his may be the theory, but even a superficial knowledge of United Nations peacekeeping 
indicates that the reality is much more complex. Few states ever relinquish full operational 
control to the United Nations.”243 There have been instances where peacekeepers turn to their 
state for instructions and approval rather than following instructions given by the force com-
mander. In a report by the Commission of Inquiry regarding attacks on UNOSOM II person-
nel, it was stated that: “The Force Commander of UNOSOM II was not in effective control of 
several national contingents which, in varying degrees, persisted in seeking orders from their 
home authorities before executing orders of the Forces Command.”244 This can be an indica-
tion of a lack of effective control by the UN over its peacekeepers and can be an argument for 
joint or dual control. The level of command and control remaining with the TCC does not, 
however, amount to exclusive control and that all conduct therefore should always be attribut-
ed to the TCC.  
 In his article, Leck raises three points, which question whether it is only the UN which 
really has effective control over its peacekeepers. Firstly, that prior to the deployment, the 
TCCs negotiate tasks and put restrictions upon the employment of peacekeepers. Second, that 
there are “intimate and structured ‘consultations’ ” between the Force Commander and the 
TCCs. And lastly, the significant input the TCCs have on Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and 
the development of operations.245 These three arguments might suggest that the UN does not 
exercise effective control as envisaged in article 7, but it could also be seen as an argument 
for dual or multiple attribution. The notion of dual or multiple attribution was not commented 
on in detail by the ILC in its commentaries to article 7 even though the ILC does not rule it 
out.246 There are several scholars who argue that this might be possible when instructions are 
given jointly,247 but instances of such joint attribution have not been many.  
 In the Behrami and Saramati cases it was argued that the conduct should be attributed 
to the NATO TCCs since they had, among other things, imposed national ROEs and retained 
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criminal jurisdiction.248 The ECtHR did not find that the TCCs exercised effective control249 
but rather that the conduct was attributable to the UN.250  
 One might ask whether it would be both easier and better to hold states responsible 
rather than the UN if the threshold for attributing conduct to the UN is too high. This ap-
proach might affect states’ willingness to contribute troops to multinational operations such as 
UN POs. The question of states’ willingness to contribute troops can be more relevant in the 
future after the Netherlands has been held responsible in the Nuhanovic and the Mothers of 
Srebrenica cases. Especially if effective control not only covers the execution of acts but also 
the ability to effectively prevent wrongful conduct. Holding states accountable might be more 
efficient as states can be brought before national and international courts. Moreover, they are 
not granted the same immunities as the UN. This could lead to greater chances to ensuring an 
effective remedy for victims of the internationally wrongful acts. 
 
5 Ways to ensure UN’s responsibility? 
The UN is currently involved in several conflicts across the world, and is supposed to pro-
mote peace and human rights. However, since the UN unfortunately has been involved in vio-
lations of international law, it is important that the UN can be held responsible in practice - 
not only in theory. As I have shown, there are difficulties holding the UN responsible. I will 
now examine what can be done to mend these problems. 
 
5.1 Conditionality policy 
As we saw in chapter 4.3, the conditionality policy is not without difficulties or criticism. The 
policy should not be used as a fig-leaf to enable the UN to avoid responsibility by being selec-
tive as to which operations MONUSCO should participate in. 
 The approach taken by the FARDC to avoid removing commanders raises the question 
of “what level of the pyramid of military command” can the policy be “most effectively ap-
plied”?251 Officers at a high level might not actually have control over lower ranking army 
members. It is suggested that the policy should aim for commanders who are aware of and 
able to prevent such atrocities. A difficulty with the policy will always be that the FARDC 
can decide to carry out operations without MONUSCO support in order to keep its command-
ing officers. 
 Furthermore, the policy must entail real consequences for these commanders. A sug-
gestion is made that “[b]eyond temporary re-assignment, it has to limit their access to promo-
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tion” and “limit the access of the worst abusers to control over the richest territories” of natu-
ral resource wealth.252 It is only when commanders face the possibility of serious consequenc-
es for their actions that the policy will become more efficient in deterring these commanders 
from committing breaches of international law. That will enable the policy to better work as a 
tool to ensure compliance with international law, as well as to enable peacekeepers to perform 
their mandated duties instead of leading to inactivity. 
 If the UN has the required knowledge of FARDC’s interpretation of the conditionality 
policy as a way to keep certain commanders, and the UN continues to support operations in 
which the commanders participate – the UN should be held responsible pursuant to DARIO 
article 14.  
 
5.2 Jurisdictional immunity: how to secure access to effective remedy  
Although immunity for the UN is needed in some instances, it should not deprive victims 
from reparations for harm suffered. Since the UN does not fulfill its obligations of establish-
ing claims commissions, the immunities granted to the organization should be evaluated. 
 
5.2.1 Proper limits for the immunity of the UN 
While immunity based on operational necessity is understandable, absolute immunity will 
lead to impunity and unjust consequences. When the UN is granted absolute immunity the 
victims have no forum or way to receive any remedy. Should UN immunity be absolute when 
the UN is in violation of the obligation to establish a claims commission as stated in the SO-
FA/CPIUN? 
 Section 20 of the CPIUN provides that the Secretary-General has a “duty to waive the 
immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the 
course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.” 
The same wording is found in section 23 of the CPIUN. Admittedly, this is in relation to indi-
viduals and not the organization itself but one can argue that it should also be the rule for the 
immunity granted to the UN as well. When the UN violates clear human rights, one can argue 
that there should be a duty to waive the immunity. As Singer states, “[t]he functional needs of 
an international organization demand respect unless a superior norm of international law posi-
tively mandates otherwise.”253 In the case of Haiti, the UN has violated several human rights 
such as, inter alia, the right to clean water, the right to health, and the right to an effective 
remedy.254 These human rights are fundamental, and hundreds of thousands of people have 
been affected by the epidemic.  
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 During a radio interview, former UN Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa, Stephen Lew-
is, said that the UN should be held responsible for the cholera outbreak. “There are instances 
where immunity should be lifted, and what happened in Haiti is one of those instances.”255 He 
also stated: “I don’t think [liability] would compromise the UN. In fact, I think it would do the 
UN a lot of good to be seen as principled in the face of having caused so much devasta-
tion.”256 Furthermore, several scholars are also of the opinion that the UN should not be im-
mune in this case.257  
 Article 105 of the Charter covers operational immunity, while the CPIUN expands the 
scope to absolute immunity. In cases such as the present one, the immunity should remain 
functional, which is necessary to make sure the UN does not evade responsibility. Functional 
immunity will enable the UN to fulfill its purposes and limit the responsibility to acts that are 
not out of “operational necessity”. This will at least ensure reparations for victims who have 
suffered from violations of IHL and IHRL when the conduct by peacekeepers exceeds what is 
necessary or, as what started the cholera epidemic, negligent behavior. 
 Operational necessity is conduct necessary to carry out tasks mandated to the peace-
keeping force. There are four elements that should be evaluated whether an act or operation is 
necessary:  
 
- a “good-faith conviction” that there is operational necessity;  
- the conduct must not exceed what is in fact necessary, and must not be simply a matter 
of “convenience or expediency”; 
- the act or operation must be carried out in accordance with an operational plan; 
- the damage should be proportional with what was necessary.258 
 
For functional immunity to be effective and to avoid responsibility, these criteria 
should be applied strictly as to avoid misunderstandings regarding the scope of operational 
necessity. The principles in sections 20 and 23 of the CPIUN apply to the organization itself, 
particularly as the UN is one of the greatest organizations meant to protect and promote hu-
man rights and international peace and security. 
 Limiting the responsibility of the UN to private law matters is understandable seeing 
as international law largely concerns states rather than private persons. However, it is insuffi-
cient for the UN to respond to a claim by stating that it is a political or policy matter without 
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further explanation or at least an official apology to the victims for the wrong that has been 
done. 
 
5.2.2 Other mechanisms to provide reparations 
The UN should comply with its obligations to establish a standing claims commission and 
thereby providing effective remedy to the victims of its wrongdoing.259 The UN has the op-
portunity to establish a UN internal “local claims review board”.260 This procedure leaves “the 
investigation, processing and final adjudication of the claims entirely in the hands of the Or-
ganization”261, which might not be in compliance with a fair and independent process.262 Fur-
thermore, the disputes before the board are not made public, and the board is established after 
a dispute arises.263 This mechanism is for these reasons insufficient, and with the number of 
claims against the UN growing, the process before the review board is experiencing “longer 
delays in the settlement of claims”264 causing that “a significant number of claims remain … 
unresolved at the end of the [review boards’] liquidation period”.265 
 So-called lump-sum agreements have been used in the case of Congo in the 1960s. 
The success of these arrangements depend both on the government’s ability to negotiate with 
the UN, and a fair distribution to the victims of the sum given by the UN.266 This is not neces-
sarily the best way to ensure the fair reparation to the victims. 
 Another possibility would be to expand the ICJ’s jurisdiction so that the UN can ap-
pear before it. Article 34 of the ICJ Statute provides that only states can appear before the ICJ. 
Although legal persons do not have standing before the ICJ, a State may stand as their repre-
sentative if there has been a breach of an international obligation.267 The Charter, the CPIUN 
and the ICJ Statute were made before the UN became such an important actor in the interna-
tional community. The idea of allowing the UN access to the ICJ has been raised on several 
occasions. In 1945, Venezuela suggested that IOs should be able to appear before the ICJ.268 
In 1954, the Institut de Droit International saw it as a matter of urgency to provide access to 
the court for IOs if a majority of the member states were members of the UN or parties to the 
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ICJ Statute.269 The ILA expressed the desire of an amendment to give the UN and its Special-
ized Agencies access to the ICJ in contentious cases.270 
 Furthermore, the ICJ judge, and former President, Mohammed Bedjaoui suggested 
that the ICJ’s contentious jurisdiction should perhaps be broadened to include IOs: 
 
“International life shows us every single day that, at this level, greater account 
must be taken of other entities, notably, the international organizations. Access to 
the Court’s contentious procedure, currently reserved for States alone, may there-
fore now seem too narrow.”271 
 
Despite being theoretically possible to expand the ICJ’s jurisdiction, actually doing 
so would be more problematic. An amendment to the ICJ Statute requires a high lev-
el of consensus: the same level of consensus as an amendment to the Charter.272 Any 
amendments to the Charter or the ICJ Statute must be  
 
“adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and rati-
fied in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of 
the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the 
Security Council”273 
 
Although legally possible, it will be politically difficult to agree to such an expansion 
of the ICJ’s jurisdiction.  
The best option would be for the UN to comply with its obligation to estab-
lish a standing claims commission. The UN and the Host State would each appoint 
one member of the commission and the parties would jointly appoint the last,274 
thereby ensuring more trust in the commission’s independence and fairness as op-
posed to the “local claims review board.” This would enable the victims to be heard 
and get some form of judicial review. 
 
5.3 A more suitable test for attribution of conduct than ‘effective control’? 
Since there are some difficulties regarding how to apply effective control in practice, perhaps 
there are other tests more appropriate to encompass the complexities. The ‘ultimate authority 
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and control’ test, the ‘overall control’ test, and multiple attribution of conduct have been sug-
gested by scholars and courts. 
 
5.3.1 ‘Ultimate authority and control’ as applied in the Behrami and Saramati 
cases 
While DARIO uses effective control as the determining test, the ECtHR did not apply it. In-
stead, they relied on the “ultimate authority and control” test which has been criticized.275 The 
ECtHR concluded in the Behrami and Saramati cases that the conduct by UN Mission in Ko-
sovo (UNMIK) and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops in Kosovo is attributable to the UN 
using the ‘ultimate authority and control’ test. Seeing as the acts were attributable to the UN, 
the Court was not competent to examine the case further. 
 In the Saramati case, Ruzhdi Saramati was arrested and the KFOR Commanders ex-
tended his detention period. It was argued that this way of proceeding was against articles 5 
(right to liberty and security) and 6 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ECHR). Since the commanders who extended his detention period were Norwe-
gian and French, the case was brought against Norway and France.276 
 In the Behrami case, it was argued that the French KFOR troops had failed to de-mine 
or mark the areas where they knew cluster bombs were. This caused the death of Gadaf Beh-
rami and the injuries of Bekim Behrami, and the application was founded on article 2 ECHR 
(right to life).277 The two cases were joined before the ECtHR, and the Court came to the con-
clusion that it was within the mandate of KFOR to issue detention orders and the supervision 
of de-mining was in UNMIK’s mandate.278 The Court also noted that the mandates were 
based on a Chapter VII resolution279 and since UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN, 
UNMIK’s conduct was attributable to the UN.280  
 In regards to KFOR the Court saw the question as being “whether the UNSC retained 
ultimate authority and control so that operational command only was delegated.”281 The Court 
then interpreted S/Res/1244 (1999) to conclude that the Security Council retained ultimate 
authority and control over KFOR and that NATO was delegated the operational command.282 
Even though the TCCs had some authority over its troops, the Court considered it of im-
portance that the operational command NATO had was effective.283 
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 As Larsen points out, the Court does not provide legal basis for the ultimate authority 
and control test - the expression does not occur in the commentaries to ARSIWA or DARIO, 
or in ICJ’s case law.284 However, some support can be found in legal literature.285 
 The ultimate authority and control test has been criticized for simply attributing con-
duct and responsibility to the UN as long as it was the UN who had given the mandate.286 As 
a test for attribution of conduct, the test is very wide.287 Furthermore, the ILC and several 
scholars rejected the ultimate authority and control test,288 as did the Secretary-General when 
he stated: “It is understood that the international responsibility of the United Nations will be 
limited to the extent of its effective operational control.”289 
 If the ultimate authority and control test is the appropriate one, “it would produce 
grossly unjust results” and victims would often “be without remedy for the harm done to 
them.”290 If giving the mandate would be sufficient for conduct to be attributed to the UN, the 
UN would be held responsible simply because they authorized the operation. The threshold 
for attribution of conduct would be too low, thereby relieving states from becoming responsi-
ble. Furthermore, the states might lose the incentive to make sure their troops act in conformi-
ty with international law since they would not be held responsible.291 Clarifying the parame-
ters for international legal responsibility would create the necessary legal certainty as to who 
is to be held responsible for a given conduct. Lack of such certainty would lead to unjust re-
sults towards individuals given the jurisdictional immunity given to the UN through article 
105 of the Charter292 and the CPIUN.  
 
5.3.2 ’Overall control’ in the Tadic case 
Another possible test for attribution of conduct could be the “overall control” test from the 
Tadic case before the ICTY. The ICTY had to determine whether the conflict in Bosnia was 
an international or a non-international armed conflict.293 The conflict would be international if 
it involved two or more states, or if it was against one state and armed forces belonging to a 
“Party to the conflict”.294 If the conflict was a non-international armed conflict, Tadic could 
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not be held liable for breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, seeing as article 2 states it is 
only applicable in international conflicts.  
 The Appeals Chamber found the effective control test, as applied in the Nicaragua 
case, to be against the system of international responsibility and by setting the threshold too 
high it would enable states to act through private individuals.295 The Appeals Chamber further 
held that there should be a flexible approach to the question and both effective control and the 
overall control tests were relevant but under different circumstances. Whereas the effective 
control test would be more appropriate in relation to the acts of private individuals296 the 
overall control test was more suitable for the acts of armed groups.297 Accordingly, the overall 
control test would be applicable to a group of peacekeepers and attributing their conduct to 
the UN. 
 In the overall control test it is sufficient to exercise “overall control over the group, not 
only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general 
planning of its military activity”.298 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber stated it was not nec-
essary to give instructions “concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged 
violations of international humanitarian law”.299 Despite “effective control” being the test 
used by the ICJ, the Appeals Chamber did look at state practice and jurisprudence to find sup-
port for the overall control test.300 
 The ICJ stated in the Genocide case that the overall control test “has the major draw-
back of broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle 
governing the law of international responsibility”.301 Leck argues that the test would simply 
lower the threshold for attribution of conduct and would still have the same difficulties with 
the command and control system as effective control.302 As with the ultimate authority and 
control test, the overall control test would set the threshold too low and the UN would auto-
matically become responsible thus creating unjust results.303  
 
5.3.3 Dual or multiple attribution 
Seeing as TCCs do in fact have full command over its contingents, one should look at the 
possibility of attributing the conduct to both the UN and the TCCs, thus possibly holding all 
parties involved responsible. In its commentaries, the ILC does not exclude the possibility of 
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dual or multiple attribution,304 meaning that the conduct of the contingents can be attributed to 
both the TCC and the UN. As it is noted, “attribution of responsibility and attribution of con-
duct do not necessarily correspond to each other, in that the effective functioning of each does 
not depend on the other”.305 In this case it is the multiple attribution of conduct that is ques-
tioned. Dual or multiple attribution can occur when one person or organ acts on behalf of 
more than one state or organization at the same time, or when the conduct is carried out joint-
ly by two or more entities each acting on behalf of its own state or IO.306 
 Even though the ILC does not dismiss the possibility of dual or multiple attribution, 
the ILC also states in relation to DARIO article 7 that the “criterion for attribution of conduct 
either to the contributing state or to the receiving organization is based … on the factual con-
trol” exercised over the specific conduct.307 The wording “either” and “or” seems to suggest 
attribution of conduct is exclusive to one entity.308 Messineo regards DARIO article 7 as an 
exception to multiple attribution of conduct and that it is meant to determine which entity the 
conduct is exclusively attributable to.309 Additionally, it has been said that “conduct is in prin-
ciple attributed to one actor only” and that “[d]ual attribution, if possible at all, is very ra-
re”.310 This could mean that the ILC’s position that multiple attribution is possible would fall 
under DARIO article 9 where the organization acknowledges the conduct as its own.311 The 
ECtHR in the Behrami and Saramati cases examined whether the conduct was attributable to 
the UN instead of the TCCs, “which indicates its assumption that the conduct could only be 
attributed to one or the other.”312 
 On the other hand, some scholars and national courts seem to accept that dual or mul-
tiple attribution of conduct is possible and should perhaps be the standard rule.313 POs are 
carried out by troops made available by TCCs, and as mentioned, DARIO makes a distinction 
between State organs fully and not fully seconded to the organization. As Sari comments, 
“seconded State organs only carry out tasks on behalf of the receiving organization because 
they are under the instructions of their home State to do so in the first place”314 and this can be 
an argument for that no State organ can be completely transferred to an organization, and ac-
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cordingly being under joint control. When it comes to national contingents this is even more 
evident seeing as the TCC retains criminal jurisdiction. 
 Gaja states: 
  
“With regard to the military operations run by forces put at the disposal of the 
United Nations, effective control will generally rest with the United Nations. How-
ever, there have been circumstances under which the contributing State has played 
a decisive role in the conduct of its forces. Conduct will then have to be attributed 
to the State or, as the case may be, jointly to the State and the Organization.”315  
 
According to him, joint attribution of conduct is therefore not ruled out, neither is it ruled out 
in relation to DARIO article 7 as is seen in the Seventh Report.316 He suggested in relation to 
the Bankovic and the Legality of the Use of Force cases, “one envisageable solution would be 
for the relevant conduct to be attributed both to NATO and to one or more of its member 
States, for instance because those States contributed to planning the military action or to car-
rying it out.”317 He further suggests that the acts can be contributed to one entity, while omis-
sion of preventative measures could be contributed to the other.318 
 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands affirmed the Court of Appeal’s 
approach to dual or multiple attribution of conduct in the Nuhanovic case.319 The Court of 
Appeal opened up the possibility that both the UN and the State had effective control, thus 
opening the possibility for dual attribution of conduct.320 The Hague Court of Appeal stated 
explicitly that  
 
the Court adopts as a starting point that the possibility that more than one party has 
“effective control” is generally accepted, which means that it cannot be ruled out 
that the application of this criterion results in the possibility of attribution to more 
than one party.321 
 
The District Court of the Hague also opens for dual attribution in the case of Mothers of Sre-
brenica.322 
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 Dual or multiple attribution of conduct is still controversial although there are good 
reasons for accepting such an approach when the TCCs send troops to a PO. By making it 
possible for both entities to become responsible for the same conduct it might encourage the 
TCCs to train their troops thoroughly as to avoid breaches of international law. It might also 
lead the UN to avoid “pursuing riskier tactical operations”.323 
 
5.3.4 A proper solution? 
None of the suggested tests are without difficulties. One must try to find the solution which 
best meets the complexities of POs, as well as offers the best results in terms of sharing the 
responsibility between the UN and TCCs and ensuring that victims of violations receive repa-
rations for harm suffered. Although the effective control test has its difficulties, it is submitted 
that the effective control test over factual circumstances would be the appropriate threshold if 
combined with the possibility of dual or multiple attribution of conduct. It has been stated that 
”[m]ost scholars and jurists generally hold that peacekeepers are, in general, under the effec-
tive control of the UN during that period that they are placed at the disposal of the UN, except 
for that rare instance when a TCC may override the Force Commanders instructions and as-
sume effective control.”324 This will ensure the balance between the need for TCCs to proper-
ly train their contingents and ensure compliance, as well as attributing the conduct to the enti-
ty that ordered the conduct or the entity which “was in the best position to prevent the con-
duct.”325 
 Evaluating which entity in fact had effective control, and possibly considering the 
troops as being under joint control, would cover more likely scenarios and be the most flexi-
ble approach.326 Lastly, “dual or multiple attribution of conduct, leading to joint or several 
responsibility of the parties concerned, would be in line with the aims of international respon-
sibility, which is to prevent breaches of international law through deterrence.”327 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
Accountability for IOs is a topic that needs to be addressed more in the future. As shown, 
holding the UN responsible is not without difficulties given the immunities granted, the com-
plexities with the command and control structure in POs, and the opportunity the UN has to 
adopt resolutions and policies. Although the international community needs peacekeepers in 
the frontlines working for peace and security, it is also important to be able to hold the organ-
ization (UN or relevant regional or security organization) responsible for their mistakes.  
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 Policies and resolutions adopted by the UN can indeed be beneficial and lead to com-
pliance with international law. The conditionality policy might work as leverage and steer the 
tragic situation in the DRC in a more positive direction. However, as shown, it can also lead 
to ineffective POs as the host state can choose to carry out operations without UN assistance. 
If that is the consequence of the policy, the UN should not be able to simply stand on the side-
line and watch violations of international law being committed. The UN would be free from 
legal responsibility pursuant to DARIO art 14 but from a moral and ethical standpoint, it 
would hardly be appropriate for the biggest promoter of peace and security. 
 Determining the appropriate test for attribution of conduct is important. There needs to 
be clear rules for when the UN or the TCC is responsible for the conduct in question. If the 
threshold for attribution to the UN is too low, the TCCs might become less thorough in train-
ing their troops to comply with international law. On the other hand, if the threshold is too 
high, states would become responsible more often and perhaps more hesitant when it comes to 
contributing troops. 
More important than determining the proper threshold for attribution is determining 
the proper limits for the UN’s immunity, which the situation in Haiti has especially highlight-
ed. If the immunity is absolute, the UN can always avoid responsibility no matter what poli-
cies it adopts or which test for attribution is used. This would damage the organization’s cred-
ibility and legitimacy. Immunity for organizations is necessary from a functional point of 
view, however, gross negligence such as in the cholera incident should not be accepted. 
Therefore, it is my contention that the issue of immunity and accountability should be given 
more attention.  
Additionally, the establishment of a claims commission pursuant to the SOFA should 
be mandatory and should be established routinely at the arrival of the peacekeeping troops. 
The UN should comply with its obligations it enters with the host state, as well as comply 
with the obligation to provide reparation. This could also mean an official apology, something 
the victims of the cholera outbreak never have received. It remains to be seen how the UN 
will continue to deal with the criticism in relation to the situation in Haiti, as well as how the 
UN will handle future problems.  
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